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Empathic perspective-taking is the psychological process that enables us to identify and 
understand other people’s emotions. A recent study published in Science (Kidd & Castano, 2013) 
suggests that reading literary fiction can improve empathic perspective-taking abilities. In the 
present investigation, I present a history of scientific efforts to explain and measure empathy as 
well as how empathic perspective-taking is diminished in individuals with personality disorders. 
I review efforts at an extension of existing research that resulted in a failed replication with 
important repercussions. I outline potential directions for researchers looking to investigate the 
relationship of empathic perspective-taking, literary fiction, and personality organization.  
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Chapter I: Review of the Literature 
Empathy as a Construct 
Empathy is a complex psychological phenomenon that allows human beings to understand 
the mental life of another person. Empathy allows us to operate in a world of others and is vital 
to our understanding of social relations. In contemporary psychology, empathy is commonly 
defined as “... a complex form of psychological inference in which observation, memory, 
knowledge, and reasoning are combined to yield insights into the thoughts and feelings of 
others” (Ickes, 1997, p.2). Empathy is understood to operate flexibly, incorporating multiple 
social-cognitive processes, including affective and cognitive dimensions. Furthermore, 
integration of these cognitive and affective dimensions only becomes possible once the 
individual is capable of fully differentiating self from other (Decety & Jackson, 2004). 
However, different subfields of psychology have created their own terminology to describe 
empathic processes. These differences make comparisons of empathy studies difficult; divergent 
terminologies prohibit the integration of perspectives in a meaningful way. This has unfortunate 
consequences on our collective understanding of empathy and how it operates, as researchers 
from divergent theoretical camps use research that operates under fundamentally different 
conceptualizations without addressing these differences.  
In the Interpersonal Reactivity Index (IRI; Davis, 1983), perhaps the most widely used 
empathy self-report measure, empathy is conceptualized as a multidimensional construct 
comprised of affective and cognitive dimensions, as well as sympathetic concern for those in 
need (labelled “Empathic Concern”). Most researcher psychologists do not conceptualize 




(Cognitive Theory of Mind) and affective (Affective Theory of Mind) dimensions of empathic 
perspective-taking. It makes intuitive sense to separate these processes; one may be able to feel 
beneficence towards a suffering other without having an accurate understanding of their internal 
state. Likewise, one may appreciate how another is feeling without experiencing warmth or 
kindness towards them. In the following pages, I choose the term “empathic perspective-taking” 
as an explicit reference to our ability to understand the thoughts and feelings of others rather than 
our capacity to feel concern for suffering others.  
Theodor Lipps and Empathy as ‘Imaginative Projection’ 
Contemporary conceptualizations of empathy can be traced back to the writings of the 
19th century aesthetic philosopher, Theodor Lipps. Lipps used the word “Einfühlung” (which 
roughly translates as “feeling-into”) as the psychological capacity to admire aesthetics and 
beauty in the natural world. Lipps was not of the opinion that we can appraise artwork in an 
objective sense, as if they had a meaning independent from the viewer. Rather, we project parts 
of our own psychology into aesthetic objects and derive meaning from these projections (Zahavi, 
2014; Lipps, 1909).  
For Lipps, every human is a subject that lives in a world of objects, including things, 
persons, and ideas. He believed we are epistemically limited in our capacity know the external 
world objectively. Our subjective world becomes the lens through which we interpret all external 
stimuli. Lipps further argued that we disavow the role our own psychology imparts on our 




intentions we unconsciously prescribed to them. Dan Zahavi beautifully summarizes the 
ramifications of this conceptualization of empathy: 
One implication of Lipps’ model is that there are rather strict limitations to what I 
can come to understand empathically. The imitated expression can only evoke an 
affective state in myself that resembles the affective state of the other if I myself 
have had the affective state in question in the past… Lipp’s account of empathy 
doesn’t allow me to recognize anything in the other that is new, anything that I am 
not familiar with, anything that I haven’t put there myself. Lipps repeatedly speaks 
of other individuals as multiplications of one’s own ego, that is, as products of 
empathic self-identification. (p.105, Zahavi, 2014) 
The consequences for this way of understanding empathy are important. If our ability to 
empathize with others depends upon our own psychological capabilities, then people vary in the 
projections they impart onto objects. This, in turn, creates different experience of those 
objects.  This explains why different individuals can have radically different experiences of a 
work of art, or different interpretations of film or literature. This imaginative projection 
hypothesis not only provides a means of understanding our experience of aesthetic objects, but 
also provides a model for why individuals interpret the same social interactions in divergent 
ways.  
However, the fact that other human beings have their own subjectivity means that the 




states they truly experience. In this way, individuals differ in their capacity to understand others’ 
perspectives depending upon the match between one’s projections and the other’s real subjective 
states. This accuracy is rooted in deep psychological structures, including personality.  
The Imaginative Projection Hypothesis in Psychoanalytic Theory 
Lipps’ imaginative projection theory had a profound influence on 20th century 
psychology. Iterations of his theory can be found in multiple contemporary psychological 
theories. Psychoanalytic theory, in particular, embraced Lipps’ imaginative projection theory as 
the underlying psychological mechanism that drives social relations. Sigmund Freud was one of 
the first empirical psychologists to wrestle with how empathy functioned, both intrapsychically 
and between persons. An historical analysis performed by Pigman (1995) demonstrated Freud 
was heavily influenced by Lipps. Utilizing similar language to Lipps, Freud posited that, "A path 
leads from identification by way of imitation to empathy, that is, to the comprehension of the 
mechanism by means of which we are enabled to take up an attitude at all towards another 
mental life" (Freud, 1921, p. 110). Freud, like Lipps, proposes that interpersonal relations are 
really intrapsychic identifications that pave the way to mutual understanding.  
Freud proposed that the capacity for empathy emerged only after the development of the 
ability to differentiate between self and other. This makes intuitive sense; if one cannot 
differentiate between the subjective self and others, then it would be impossible to project self-
states into the object. Rather, in the pre-reflective period, objects may be experienced as part of 




imagine what others may be thinking and feeling (Ogden, 1993) Also consistent with Lipps, 
Freud postulated empathic psychological processes, and emotional functioning generally, occur 
unconsciously (Lipps, 1903; Pigman, 1995).  
Contemporary psychoanalytic theories also adopted the imaginative projection hypothesis as 
an explanation for empathy. Harry Stack Sullivan, for example, described empathy as "... the 
peculiar emotional linkage that subtends the relationship of the infant with other significant 
people-the mother or the nurse” (Sullivan, 2012). Under this formulation, empathy is the 
affective connection that allows the infant to relate to early attachment figures. Sullivan 
emphasizes the evolutionary function of this relational tool for infants to garner nutrition and to 
negotiate a harsh and dangerous world.   
From a Kleinian perspective, babies initially inhabit a pre-linguistic mode of experiencing 
without clear boundaries between the self and objects. As infants begin to experience necessary 
environmental frustrations, they begin formulating a theory of self and other that allows for 
projection of feeling states (Ogden, 1993). Assuming healthy psychological development with an 
attuned caregiver, infants eventually acquire the capacity to conceptualize objects with greater 
complexity.  The emphasis of both Harry Stack Sullivan and the neo-Kleinians on the 
developmental relationship suggests that early experiences with caregivers, whether good or bad, 
lay the groundwork for our ability to understand others’ mental lives. 
Heinz Kohut, founder of Self- Psychology, presented a similar intrapsychic theoretical 




provides an example of how empathy operates in the following hypothetical scenario in which a 
therapist must understand the inner states of a uniquely tall patient: 
Only when we think ourselves into his place, only when we, by vicarious 
introspection begin to feel his unusual size as if it were our own and thus revive 
inner experience in which we had been unusual or conspicuous, only then begins 
there for us an appreciation of the meaning that the unusual size may have for this 
person and only then have we observed a psychological fact. (p.461, Kohut, 1959) 
 Just as in the imaginative projection theory, Kohut suggests we use our own feelings to 
access the imagined feeling states of others. In his last seminar, Kohut postulated a deeper form 
of empathic attunement: “...the move from understanding to explaining… and the next step of 
giving of interpretations is a move from a lower form of empathy to a higher form of empathy” 
(p. 129, Kohut, 1981). Kohut maintained that even while accurately understanding the 
experience of another is an empathic response, we can achieve a deeper empathic stance by 
understanding the psychological structures that underlie the imagined feeling state. In this 
framework, the therapist’s empathically mediated interpretations help the patient understand 
their intrapsychic life and its impact on conscious feeling states. Under a Kohutian lens, the 
effectiveness of the therapy depends upon the quality of the therapist’s empathic attunement and 
ability to communicate this understanding in a manner the patient will be able to hear.  
 The importance of empathic processes for understanding others is not unique to the 




intelligence,” theoretically synonymous with capacity for empathic perspective-taking, have 
more intimate and fulfilling social relationships, higher marital satisfaction, and surround 
themselves with highly empathic others (Schutte et al., 2001). Given that the ability to accurately 
take the perspective of others is vital to social functioning, it is important to understand what 
factors impede and promote the development of this capacity. Variability in adult empathic 
perspective-taking ability suggests there are biological and developmental factors that shape 
these abilities during childhood and continue to affect them into adulthood.  
Early Attachment and Empathic Perspective-taking in Adults 
The quality of attachment relationships early in life has a profound impact on the ability to 
take on the perspective of others in adulthood. Peter Fonagy, a psychoanalyst and clinical 
psychologist, has devoted his career to integrating psychoanalytic conceptualizations of empathic 
perspective-taking (which he terms “mentalization”) and empirical work on the developmental 
impact of attachment relationships. Furthermore, his laboratory has developed a treatment for 
patients who lack the ability to think accurately about others’ mental states called Mentalization 
Based Treatment (MBT; Fonagy & Bateman, 2006). Briefly reviewing the theoretical constructs 
that ground MBT will help in understanding the findings of attachment literature.  
Rather than using existing terminologies, the authors of MBT introduced two new terms that 
function as empirical operationalizations of empathy: mentalization and reflective function (RF). 
Mentalization is defined as “The capacity to perceive and understand oneself and others in terms 




one’s own and others’ behavior in terms of mental states, i.e., reflection” (p. 6, Fonagy, 1998). 
Underlying the capacity for mentalization is a capacity for Reflective Functioning (RF): RF 
involves both a self-reflective and an interpersonal component that ideally provides the 
individual with a well-developed capacity to distinguish inner from outer reality, pretend from 
‘real’ modes of functioning, intra-personal mental and emotional processes from interpersonal 
communications” (pg. 4, Fonagy, 1998). While these terms are similar to prior psychoanalytic 
conceptualizations of empathy, RF emphasizes the role of self-awareness in discriminating 
between one’s own intrapsychic idiosyncrasies and the feeling states of the other.   
 The authors of the MBT postulate that the capacity for empathic perspective-taking derives 
from the quality of attachment relationships during infancy and childhood. Attachment patterns 
were first conceptualized by Mary Ainsworth in her “Strange Situation” experiment (Ainsworth 
& Bell, 1970). In the experiment, children are left in a playroom by their primary caregiver. 
After, a different adult enters the room and tries to interact with the child. The stranger then 
leaves and the child is reacquainted with their primary caretaker. Securely attached children 
welcomed their caretaker’s return after separation and allowed themselves to be comforted 
despite the stress of the situation. Anxiously attached children often displayed ambivalence upon 
the return of a caregiver and did not let themselves be comforted. Children with avoidant 
attachment generally did not respond to the caregivers return and, like anxiously attached 





 According to MBT, a secure attachment leads to healthy psychological development, while 
anxious or avoidant attachment styles often result in a diminished capacity for mentalization later 
in life. These findings have been corroborated both inside and outside the MBT research 
laboratory (Meins et al., 1998; Villichan-Lyra et al., 2015; Rosso et al., 2016). In one of these 
studies, attachment security was measured during infancy. Different psychological measures 
were used to assess mentalization as the children grew older. Children with secure attachments 
had great capacity for symbolic play at age three and better mentalizing abilities at age five than 
children with insecure and avoidant attachments to caregivers (Meins et al., 1998). These results 
were found regardless of differences in cognitive capacity of the children.   
In another study, Rosso et al. (2016) investigated whether attachment style and reflective 
function of primary caregivers predicted their children’s capacity for mentalization. They 
assessed the attachment styles of mothers with the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI; George et 
al. 1985) and RF through the Reflective Functioning Scale (RFS; Fonagy et al. 1998). They 
found that mothers with secure attachments scored significantly higher on reflective functioning 
indices than mothers with a generally insecure attachment style. They also found that mothers 
with higher reflective function scores had more securely attached children, who in turn had 
demonstrated greater mastery over emotional, cognitive, and psychological language as they 
developed. Lastly, securely attached children also had higher scores on mentalization indices as 




In another study, Fonagy et al. (1991) demonstrated that the attachment style of prospective 
parents was a predictor of their one-year old’s attachment style at 20 months follow-up. The 
relationship between caregiver mentalization abilities and the security of the attachment 
relationships also holds true in the face of trauma. In a study among mothers who had suffered 
trauma, only those who had high mentalization abilities had securely attached children, while 
those mothers with low mentalization abilities tended to have insecurely attached children 
(Fonagy et al.,1995). These studies demonstrate that having an attuned caregiver that provides a 
language for cognitive, emotional, and psychological life paves the way for children’s capacity 
to mentalize later in life. A secure attachment appears to be a necessary precursor to the 
development of mentalization and related psychological capacities.  
Empathic Perspective-taking, Insecure Attachment and Personality Disorders 
The authors of MBT propose that the inability to take the perspective of others lies at the 
heart of certain types of psychopathology, particularly personality disorders (Fonagy & Bateman, 
2006). Research demonstrates that individuals with personality disorders often had insecure 
attachment relationships as children. Diana Diamond and colleagues (2014) conducted the Adult 
Attachment Interview (George et al. 1985) with a population of patients with Borderline 
Personality Disorder (BPD) and comorbid BPD/Narcissistic Personality Disorder to discern their 
predominant attachment style. The AAI includes three categories of secure/autonomous, 
dismissing/ devaluing and preoccupied attachment styles. They also include “cannot classify” 




throughout the interview. Within this five-way classification system (Main & Goldwyn. 1998), 
“dismissive” attachment is synonymous with the “insecure-avoidant” attachment of Ainsworth’s 
work (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970), while “preoccupied” attachment maps onto the “insecure-
anxious” attachment style (Daniel, 2006). Diamond et al. (2014) found that 65% of patients with 
BPD had a preoccupied attachment style (29.5% dismissive), whereas 54.5% of patients with 
comorbid BPD/NPD had a dismissive attachment style (36.4% preoccupied). Furthermore, they 
found these patients scored significantly below average on RF indices, revealing difficulties with 
differentiating between their own and other’s mental lives  
These findings corroborate earlier findings that suggested insecure attachment underlies the 
self-regulatory and interpersonal instabilities that characterize personality disorders (Fonagy et 
al. 2002). The insecure attachment produced by inadequate mirroring by caretakers inhibits the 
development of a functionally autonomous self, which results not only in a diminished capacity 
for affect regulation (Fonagy & Target, 2003), but also diffuse boundaries between 
internal/external worlds and self/other (Fonagy and Target, 2000). These difficulties have 
profound implications for the ability to take the perspective of others, and research has 
demonstrated this tendency time and again (for Antisocial Personality Disorder, Dolan & Fullam, 
2004; for Narcissistic Personality Disorder, Ritter, 2011). 
In Severe Personality Disorders, Otto Kernberg (1984) posited that personality operates on a 
continuum of functional levels. He deems these the neurotic, borderline, and psychotic levels of 




identity integration, ii) the types and severity of defense mechanisms employed, iii) and 
differences in accuracy of reality testing. Individuals with a neurotic organization tend to be well 
adjusted, are capable of integrated identities, rely on mature defense mechanisms, and have intact 
reality testing capabilities. Individuals on a borderline level of personality organization rely on 
primitive defense mechanisms and experience identity diffusion, though they retain reality 
testing capabilities. Individuals organized on the psychotic level lack identity diffusion, rely on 
primitive defense mechanisms and lack reality testing capabilities. 
Kernberg (1984) proposes the experience of identity diffusion is caused by the struggle to 
maintain complex representations of self and others:  
In contrast to neurotic structures, where all self-images (both “good” and “bad”) have been 
integrated into a comprehensive self, and where “good” and “bad” images of others can be 
integrated into a comprehensive concept of others, in borderline personality organization 
such integration fails, and both self and object representations remain multiple, 
contradictory, affective- cognitive representations of self and others (p.12). 
This is consistent with Fonagy’s conception of Reflective Functioning (Fonagy, 1998). If an 
individual lacks the capacity for complex representations of their internal states, then it will also 
be impossible to represent others’ mental lives with complexity.  
Since the attachment relationship lays the groundwork for interpersonal functioning 
throughout the lifespan, it may be tempting to assume empathic perspective-taking ability 




contrary, however, indicating our ability to understand other’s mental lives may improve under 
certain circumstances. 
The Study of Interest and Replication Efforts 
A recent and frequently cited study by Kidd & Castano (2013) investigated the impact that 
reading literary fiction had on adults’ capacities to understand the mental lives of others. The 
article reported the results of five separate experiments, each of which compared the 
performance on empathy tests for those who read literary fiction to those who had not. In the first 
experiment, (N=86) participants were randomly assigned to one of two groups. Participants 
either read a passage of literary fiction or nonfiction before completing two empathy measures: 
the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET; Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001) and a false 
belief task (Converse et al., 2008.) The RMET requires participants to view photographs of 36 
pairs of eyes and correctly identify the emotion being expressed in them (Baron-Cohen & 
Wheelwright, 2001). In the false belief task, (Converse et al., 2008), participants are presented 
with an interpersonal scenario and required to discern that the two persons have separate 
perspectives. Results indicated that individuals who had been placed in the literary fiction 
condition performed significantly better on the RMET than the nonfiction condition (M=25.90, 
SD=4.38 vs M= 23.47, SD= 5.17; F1,82= 6.4, P=.01). The effect size was moderate (Cohen’s d= 
.56). This main effect was not found on the false belief task (F1,63=1.47, P=.22) demonstrating no 




In Experiment 2, (N=114) the authors compared performance among three different 
conditions: literary fiction, popular fiction and no reading. The authors utilized a different 
affective Theory of Mind measure, the Diagnostic Manual of Nonverbal Accuracy 2- Adult 
Faces Test (DANVA-2AF; Nowicki, 2010). Individuals in the literary fiction condition were 
found to commit fewer errors (M=4.7, SD= 2.31) than individuals in the popular fiction (5.8, 
SD=2.93) and no reading (M=5.86, SD= 2.89) conditions, although to a lesser, “marginally 
significant” degree (F2,108=2.57, P=.08). There were no differences in performance between the 
popular fiction and no reading conditions on the DANVA-2AF (P=.98). As in experiment 1, no 
significant differences were found in performance on the false belief task (P values > 0.13). 
Experiment 3 (N=69) aimed to replicate the finding that literary fiction improved empathic 
perspective-taking while popular fiction did not, and so participants were randomly assigned to 
these conditions. As in experiment 2, the literary fiction group (M= 25.92, SD=4.07) performed 
better than the popular fiction group (M=23.22, SD=6.16) on the RMET (F1,65=4.07, P=.04). In 
Experiment 4, (N=72) the authors replaced the false belief task with a more complex cognitive 
measure, the Yoni Test (Shamay-Tsoory & Aharon-Peretz, 2007). Results replicated the main 
effect of prior experiments: the literary fiction (M=26.19, SD= 5.43) condition performed better 
than the popular fiction group (M= 23.71, SD= 5.08) on the RMET (F1,68=4.39, P=.04). 
Furthermore, participants in the literary fiction condition performed better on the Yoni Test than 




 In the 5th (N=356) and last experiment, the authors replicated previous findings with a larger 
sample, which allowed them to control demographic variables such as gender, age, ethnicity, and 
level of education. In this experiment, participants were randomly assigned to either a literary 
fiction, popular fiction, or no reading condition before completing the RMET and Yoni 
Test.  The main effect for RMET performance was replicated: individuals in the literary fiction 
condition (M= 26.21, SD=3.59) performed better than the individuals in the popular fiction (M= 
24.96, SD= 4.6) and no reading (M=25.2, SD= 4.69) condtioins (F2,352=3.1, P=.04). This main 
effect was not replicated for the Yoni Task, however (F2,351=2.88, P=.052). 
This main effect has been replicated in two other laboratories since the initial publication 
(Black & Barnes, 2015; Panero et al., 2016). Black & Barnes (2015) utilized a within-subjects 
design, randomly assigning participants into one of two possible parallel procedures. In one 
condition, participants read a passage of non-fiction before completing the RMET, then after a 
break read literary fiction and completed the RMET again. The other half of the participants 
were placed in the opposite sequence, reading literary fiction first than non-fiction after a break. 
Their results reflected the same main effect found in the Kidd & Castano (2013) study, though 
with a smaller effect size. They argued this smaller effect size was likely due to practice effects, 
since most participants had improved performance on the 2nd administration of the RMET 
regardless of condition. 
Black & Barnes (2015) extended this line of research by investigating whether watching 




watched a documentary. They found that individuals who watched television dramas performed 
significantly better on the RMET than individuals in the TV documentary group (Black & 
Barnes, 2015). This study is notable because it suggests there is a shared mechanism in literary 
fiction and television drama that expands the empathic perspective-taking abilities of 
readers/viewers.   
In another effort at replication, Panero et al. (2016) reported they followed the same 
methodological procedure as the Kidd & Castano (2013) study with a much larger sample size 
(N= 782) across four conditions: literary fiction, popular fiction, non-fiction and no reading 
conditions. Contrary to the prior studies, however, they found no improved performance in the 
literary fiction group on the RMET. In a commentary response, Kidd & Castano (2017) argued 
that the Panero et al. (2016) study had significant methodological shortcomings that undermined 
the veracity of their results, and in particular that they had not checked to see whether the 
experimental manipulation (reading) was completed by participants.  
In the original study, Kidd & Castano (2013) removed the results from participants who took 
less than 30 seconds to read a page. Panero et al. (2016) claimed to have removed participants 
who deviated +3.5 SD from the mean reading time, yet Kidd & Castano (2017) found these 
participants were not actually removed from data analyses. Furthermore, Kidd & Castano (2017) 
found that participants were not randomly assigned, as different experimental groups had widely 
discrepant numbers of participants. After excluding participants with significantly deviant 




literary fiction condition did in fact perform significantly better on the RMET than the other 
conditions (Kidd & Castano, 2017). 
The Possible Impact of Personality Organization on the Use of Literary Fiction 
Having demonstrated the main effect across five experiments and finding further validation 
in two replication efforts, the effect of literary fiction on empathic perspective-taking seems to be 
robust. Kidd & Castano (2013) suggest that, “… through the systematic use of phonological, 
grammatical, and semantic stylistic devices, literary fiction defamiliarizes its readers,” and that 
it, “… uniquely engages the psychological processes needed to gain access to character’s 
subjective experiences” (p. 378). Notably, however, they do not discuss the difference between 
priming Theory of Mind capacities temporarily and improving them permanently.  They admit 
the brevity of their intervention likely didn’t result in lasting change, stating, “…it is unlikely 
that people learned much more about others by reading any of the short texts (p.380.)” It seems 
implied that a more lasting change in perspective-taking would require repeated experiences with 
defamiliarization rather than the brief intervention of their experiment.   
 Jeremy Holmes, author of The Therapeutic Imagination, similarly argues literature can 
provide a unique and powerful window into the mind of others, stating that, “… literature can… 
be seen as a mentalizing via regia. In the novel, with the help of the omniscient author, the inner 
world of the Other is freely accessible to the reader in ways that are impossible in real life” (p. 
x). These authors suggest literary fiction gives readers direct access to the subjective states of 




others’ subjective states expands the reader’s appreciation of the other as subject (rather than as 
object), making it possible to conceptualize of more complex emotions in others. Kidd & 
Castano (2013) suggest the empathic gains made through reading literary fiction might improve 
Theory of Mind in real interpersonal interactions. We need to determine, however, whether 
literary fiction could serve this function for individuals at all levels of personality organization.  
I suggest that an individual must have developed certain psychological capabilities to benefit 
from the mechanism that is being proposed by Kidd & Castano (2013). Literary fiction may 
function in this way for neurotically organized individuals who have an integrated identity and 
who aren’t likely to project unprocessed primitive affects onto characters in the text. For 
individuals who can maintain complex representations of their own and others’ mental states, the 
access to a character’s subjective state in literary fiction might allow for new psychological 
experiences that expands the reader’s reservoir of emotional experiences. 
These psychological capabilities depend in large part on whether the reader has developed a 
capacity for Reflective Functioning (RF) that allows for the differentiation between their own 
intrapsychic experiences and those of others. If the reader does not have these capabilities, as is 
the case with individuals on a borderline or psychotic level of character organization, they may 
project elements of their own intrapsychic life on both real and fictional scenarios. Indeed, 
individuals who lack Reflective Functioning capacities can only interpret others’ experiences as 
their own. This inability to see the other as subject significantly limits the extent to which the 




Kidd & Castano (2013) also posit that literary fiction can “pose(s) fewer risks than the real 
world and… present opportunities to consider the experiences of others without facing 
potentially threatening consequences of that engagement” (p. 378). According to Kernberg’s 
theory (1984), however, individuals with a borderline level of organization experience the 
eruption of aggressive affect and project it onto neutral objects. While Kidd & Castano (2013) 
suggest literary fiction provides a uniquely safe space, individuals on a borderline level of 
organization may interpret hostility in even emotionally neutral fictional accounts. For 
individuals who operate on a borderline or psychotic level of personality organization, the 
inability to hold complex representations of self and other undermines the capacity for empathic 
perspective-taking, both real and imaginary. This should fundamentally limit the ability to use 
literary fiction to improve empathic perspective-taking.  
A Priori Hypotheses 
Hypothesis I: I predict that the mean RMET score will be significantly higher in the 
literary fiction condition compared to the non-fiction condition. 
Hypothesis II: I predict that, among individuals high in the PD/ID scale of the IPO-R, 
there will not be a significant difference in RMET performance between the literary 




Hypothesis III:  I predict that the mean score on the total Faux Pas score, and the 
Intentions, Beliefs, and Empathy subscales of on the Faux Pas Recognition Test will be 
significantly higher in the literary fiction condition compared to the nonfiction condition. 
Hypothesis IV: I predict that, among individuals who are high in the PD/ID scale of the 
IPO, there will not be a significant difference in performance on the total Faux Pas score 
and the Intentions, Beliefs, and Empathy subscales of on the Faux Pas Recognition Test 
















Chapter II: Method 
Participants 
  Participants were recruited from two sources. Their data was consolidated for analysis. 96 
participants were recruited from a large southeastern university through the psychology 
department’s undergraduate research pool. These students selected the present study among 
several options in the research directory and completed it to earn research credit in their general 
psychology course. 88 participants were recruited through the Amazon Mechanical Turk 
marketplace and paid $5.00 for their participation in the study. In both contexts, participants 
were provided with a link that directed them to complete the experiment online. The total 
number of participants (N= 187) satisfied the minimum required to detect the main effect of 
literary fiction found in the original Kidd and Castano (2013) study (calculated to be N= 49 with 
a Cohen’s d=.55, Type I error rate (α) of 95%, and statistical power, (β) at .8).  
Procedure 
The experiment was programmed on Qualtrics, a software platform which randomly 
assigned participants to the literary fiction or nonfiction condition, tracked reading time, and 
conducted complex procedural elements required for administration of the FPRT. Prior to 
beginning the experiment, participants were provided with an informed consent statement and 
electronically signed it to continue with the study. Participants then completed the Inventory of 
Personality Organization- Revised (IPO-R; Smits et al., 2009), which took around 10 minutes to 




or an essay of non-fiction. Participants then completed the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 
(RMET; Baron-Cohen & Wheelright, 2001), followed by the Faux Pas Recognition Test (Baron-
Cohen et al.,1999). These tasks were the most time consuming, taking around 30 minutes to 
complete. The entire study averaged around an hour to complete. Please find a description of 
each measure and their psychometric properties below. 
Measures 
The Inventory of Personality Organization- Revised 
The original Inventory of Personality Organization (IPO; Lenzenweger et al., 2001) grew 
out of the work of Otto Kernberg (1984) regarding personality organization. It consists of 57 
items divided into three subscales: Identity Diffusion, Reality Testing, and the Primitive 
Defenses scales. The Identity Diffusion scale assesses for affective and behavioral dimensions of 
identity integration. The Reality Testing scale measures the degree to which one has a clearly 
delineated and accurate perception of reality. The Primitive Defense items assesses the degree to 
which individuals utilize defense mechanisms such as splitting, projection, and projective 
identification. In the original study the three scales were found to be highly correlated (Primitive 
Defenses & Identity Diffusion= .97, Primitive Defenses & Reality Testing= .71, Identity 
Diffusion and Reality Testing= .67; Lenzenweger et al., 2001, p.581) Furthermore, all three 
scales showed internal consistency (Cronbach’s α > .81) and test retest reliability (r>.72). 
 A later revision of the IPO (IPO-R; Smits et al., 2009) found the IPO could effectively 




(PD) subscales were combined. They were also able to decrease the number of items necessary, 
reducing the number of items from 57 to 41. The ID/PD scale had high internal consistency 
(Cronbach’s α = .9) as did the RT scale (Cronbach’s α = .85.), and the two scales correlate 
strongly with the original IPO scales, .97 and .92 for the ID/PD and RT scales, respectively 
(Smits et al., 2009, pg. 226). 
Reading the Mind in Eyes Test 
The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test- Revised (RMET, Baron-Cohen et al. ,2001) is a 
performance-based measure consisting of 36 still images of eye regions. Participants must 
identify which among four emotions best characterizes the affect on display in the image.  
This measure was originally developed to differentiate individuals with Asperger’s syndrome 
and high functioning autism. These individuals are thought to lack important features of Theory 
of Mind typical of normative development. The RMET has since become commonly utilized as 
an “advanced Affective Theory of Mind” measure. Importantly, the iteration utilized in this 
study is a revised version of the original measure, which consisted of 25 photographs and 
required participants to choose between only two affects (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & 
Robertson, 1997). The revised version is a significant improvement upon the original and avoids 
the ceiling effect that limited its utility.  During the development of the revised version, the 






The Faux Pas Recognition Test 
The Faux Pas Recognition Test (Baron-Cohen et al.,1999) was developed to investigate 
empathic perspective-taking. The measure consists of 20 short stories, 10 of which include 
instances of a social faux pas. Participants must read the short stories and answer questions about 
them based on their understanding of the interpersonal interaction depicted in the study. The FPR 
Test assesses the participant’s ability to identify the feelings, beliefs, and intentions of the 
characters. Thus, it addresses both cognitive and affective dimensions of empathic perspective-
taking. Both a child version and an adult version of the Faux Pas Recognition Test were created; 
the adult version (Stone, Baron-Cohen, & Knight, 1998) was utilized. 
The Text Passages 
I used the same passages of fiction and nonfiction that Kidd & Castano (2013) used in 
their first study. Those authors reasoned that, “… in the absence of a clear means of quantifying 
literariness, the judgements of expert rates (i.e., literary prize jurors) were used… (thus) we 
selected literary works of fiction by award- winning or canonical writers…” (p. 378) The three 
literary fiction short stories were “The Runner” by Don Dellilo (2012), “Blind Date” by Lydia 
Davis (2010) and “A Chameleon” by Anton Chekhov (1979). For the non-fictional essays, “How 
the Potato Changed the World” by Charles Mann (2011), “Bamboo Steps Up” by Cathie Gandel 
(2008), and “The Story of the Most Common Bird in the World” by Rob Dunn (2012) were used. 





Chapter III: Results 
Exclusionary Criterion 
Some participant data was removed before analysis due to exclusionary criterion. The 
data of fifteen participants was deleted because they did not finish the experiment. Consistent 
with the criterion outlined in the Kidd & Castano (2013) study, six participants were removed for 
taking 3.5 SD above the mean reading time (calculated to be 1461 seconds) or for having an 
insufficient reading time (less than 200 seconds). Lastly, two participants were removed for 
achieving significantly low scores on the control questions on the Faux Pas Recognition Test, 
signifying significant inattention. The total participant pool used in data analysis was N= 164.  
Statistical Analyses 
 The Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) 
An ANCOVA was performed to assess the impact of reading condition on RMET performance 
when controlling for personality organization. The main effect of literary condition found in 
previous studies was not replicated in the present data set (Literary Fiction M= 26.36, SD= 3.99; 
Nonfiction M= 26.47, SD=4.24) [F(1,160)= .003, p= .957]. An ANCOVA with the Identity 
Diffusion/ Primitive Defenses as a covariate indicated it had a significant main effect 
[F(1,160)=7.321, p=.008], such that greater personality dysfunction (as evinced by higher scores) 
predicted worse performance on the RMET.  See Figure 1 on the following page for a visual 
representation of the relationship between reading condition, RMET scores, and personality 









 and reading condition was nonsignificant [F(1,160)=.001, p=.974].   
There was a significant gender effect, such that women (N= 77, M=27.53, SD= 3.69) 
scored higher on the RMET than men (N=89, M=25.48, SD=4.23) [F(1,162)=10.722, p=.001)]. 
There was also a significant positive correlation between RMET and age, r(162)= .365, p=<.001 
and age and the Identity Diffusion/ Primitive Defenses scale, r(162)= -.342, p<.001], such that 
older individuals demonstrated lower levels of personality dysfunction. Furthermore, an 
ANCOVA performed with personality organization and age as covariates revealed that 
personality organization no longer significantly contributed in explaining RMET score variance 
[F(1,160)= 1.44, p= .232], while age remained a significant variable [F(1,160)= 18.43, p< .001]. 
A similar pattern emerged with the Reality Testing subscale of the IPO; an ANOVA indicated 
higher scores predicted worse RMET performance, [F(1,163)= 1.944, p=.017], but this was no 
longer significant when age and gender were controlled [F(1,160)=3.42, p= .066]. 
The Faux Pas Recognition Test (FPRT) 
A one-way ANCOVA was performed to determine if there was a statistically significant 
difference in FPRT scores between the literary fiction and nonfiction conditions when 
controlling for personality organization. No significant differences were found. The FPRT total 
score in the literary fiction (M=35.42, SD=4.99) and nonfiction (M=36.08, SD= 3.94) conditions 
[F(1, 162)= .905,p= .343]. Please refer to Figure 2 for a graphical representation of reading 









Furthermore, no differences were found on FPRT subscale performance between the literary 
fiction and nonfiction conditions. Please see Table 1 below for significance values. 
 
Table 1: One-Way Analysis of Variance of Faux Pas Subscale Scores by Reading Condition 
FP Subscale Source df SS MS F  p 
Faux Pas Recognition Total Score Between Groups 1 18.057 18.057 0.905  0.343 
Within Groups 162 3233.138 19.958      
Intentions Between Groups 1 4.314 4.314 0.680  0.411 
Within Groups 162 1028.192 6.347      
Beliefs Between Groups 1 0.969 0.969 0.173  0.678 
Within Groups 162 905.909 5.592      
Empathy Between Groups 1 7.141 7.141 1.244  0.266 
Within Groups 
 
929.658 5.739      
 
 
ANCOVAs further determined whether personality organization impacted FPRT 
performance and whether there was an interaction between reading condition and personality 
organization. Personality organization did not significantly predict performance on any FPRT 
subscale, nor was there an interaction between personality organization and reading condition on 
these subscales; see Table 2 on the following page for these values. Men (M= 35.73, SD= 4.09) 
and women (M= 35.81, SD=4.898) did not differ in their aggregate FPRT scores [F(1,162)= 




Table 2: Analysis of Covariance of Faux Pas Subscale Scores with Personality Organization and 
Interaction as Covariates. 
Faux Pas Subscale Source SS MS F p 
Faux Pas Recognition Total Score ID/PD 11.897 11.897 0.591 0.443 
RC * ID/PD 2.698 2.698 0.134 0.715 
Intentions Subscale ID/PD 5.500 5.500 0.860 0.355 
RC*ID/PD 0.057 0.057 0.009 0.925 
Beliefs Subscale IPO_IDPD 6.556 6.556 1.167 0.282 
RC *ID/PD 0.219 0.219 0.039 0.844 
Empathy Subscale ID/PD 0.619 0.619 0.107 0.745 
RC *ID/PD   0.063 0.063 0.011 0.917 















Chapter IV: Discussion 
Does Literary Fiction Improve Empathic Perspective-taking? 
Replication is frequently encouraged within psychological science but is not done 
enough. In a recent effort to replicate 100 experiments from three empirical psychology journals 
published in 2008, only 36 achieved significant results (Open Science Collaboration, 2015). The 
present study attempted to expand upon the findings of Kidd & Castano (2013), who found that 
reading literary fiction led to improved performance on a Theory of Mind task. An attempt was 
made to account for the role personality organization might play in moderating this empathic 
gain. The main effect for literary fiction was not replicated, as there was no significant difference 
between the fiction and nonfiction conditions on RMET performance and an additional Theory 
of Mind measure. These findings are particularly striking since Kidd & Castano (2013) based 
their conclusions on five independent experiments and this main effect has been successfully 
replicated twice, albeit once unintentionally (Black & Barnes, 2015; Panero et al., 2016).  There 
were no significant methodological deviations from the original Kidd & Castano (2013) 
experiment. The sample size was more than satisfactory to detect the main effect were it present.  
 While the results of the present study suggest reading a brief passage of literary fiction 
may not  improve Theory of Mind, it does not address whether a lifelong pursuit of literary 
fiction can improve empathic perspective-taking abilities. It is possible a more meaningful 
intervention might bring about a change in empathic perspective-taking. Multiple prior studies 




taking abilities. The Author Recognition Test (ART; Acheson, Wells & MacDonald, 2008) 
assesses participant's lifetime exposure to fiction by asking them to differentiate between the 
names of real and fake authors amongst a list of names. In their original study, Kidd & Castano 
(2013) found that in four of their five experiments, higher scores on the ART predicted higher 
RMET performance. This correlation was also found in prior investigations (Mar et al.2006; Mar 
& Oakley, 2008), and in a recent study which investigated the relationship between ART, 
RMET, and alexithymia scores (Samur et al., 2017). These studies suggest individuals familiar 
with authors of fiction (theorized to represent lifelong exposure to fiction) perform better on 
empathic perspective-taking tasks.  
 We still have not determined, however, whether it is exposure to literary fiction that 
improves empathic perspective-taking, or whether highly empathic people tend to seek out 
literary fiction. While Kidd & Castano’s (2013) study attempted to answer this question, the 
present findings place this significant question back on the table. Clearly, more and different 
empirical approaches must investigate the effect reading fiction has on our abilities to understand 
other’s mental states. Perhaps the most effective way to investigate the impact of literary fiction 
is through a long-term naturalistic design. For instance, a study could be performed by 
monitoring undergraduates as they entered their academic careers. Researchers would take 
baseline measures of empathic ability and follow individuals who pursue different academic 
paths. Changes in empathic perspective-taking abilities could be measured at intervals while also 




resources but would investigate the impact of literary fiction over a long period of time and 
repeated exposure, rather than attempting to capture the subtle and temporary improvements that 
might result from a brief intervention.  
Shortcomings of Contemporary Theory of Mind Measures 
Although the RMET has become a gold standard for measuring affective Theory of 
Mind, the theoretical construct of “Theory of Mind” has limitations that have not hitherto been 
addressed and that have ramifications for how we study changes in empathic perspective-taking. 
The construct “Theory of Mind” was first introduced by Premack and Woodruff in their study of 
chimpanzee social intelligence: 
In saying that an individual has a theory of mind, we mean that the individual imputes 
mental states to himself and to others (either to conspecifics or to other species as well). A 
system of inferences of this kind is properly viewed as a theory, first, because such states 
are not directly observable, and second, because the system can be used to make 
predictions, specifically about the behavior of other organisms. (p.515, Premack & 
Woodruff, 1978) 
Thus, Theory of Mind is the metarepresentational capacity to have a “mind about minds.” 
It is a necessary but not sufficient condition for perceiving another's mental life with accuracy 
and complexity. In the eyes of its originators, one either develops a Theory of Mind or one does 
not. A categorical inability to take the perspective of others is caused by a lack of Theory of 




Cohen, 1997). The RMET and FPDT were originally developed to detect significant differences 
in scores, not the small variances we might expect across a typical adult population. 
The RMET frequently creates enough variance among participants to allow for 
statistically significant results, but researchers often frequently overstate the RMET as a measure 
of comprehensive Theory of Mind.  The RMET alone does not fully capture the 
multidimensional nature of empathy suggested in contemporary research. It is an affective 
Theory of Mind measure, designed to investigate whether participants have the capacity to 
identify others’ feeling states. To investigate whether literary fiction improves general empathic 
perspective-taking abilities, researchers must also include measures that critically assess the 
participants ability to understand others’ thoughts and intentions in addition to their feeling 
states. 
In the present study, the Faux Pas Detection Test was included due to its 
multidimensional operationalization of empathy. It is intended to test participant’s understanding 
of character’s thoughts and intentions as well as their feeling states. Unfortunately, it did not 
produce significant variance among participants’ scores. There was a ceiling effect such that 
most of the participants, regardless of reading condition and personality organization, performed 
very well on the measure. The scoring instructions for the subscales seemed overly permissive of 
a broad scope of responses (i.e., any response that referred to the Faux Pas in any capacity, or 




most responses as correct, despite significant differences in the complexity of responses, seems 
to limit its usefulness in detecting minor differences in empathic perspective-taking.  
Clearly, more nuanced measurements of empathic perspective-taking need to be 
developed to investigate differences among a population of highly functioning adults. The Adult 
Attachment Interview (George et al. 1985), for instance, would provide a nuanced understanding 
of the individual’s relational functioning and mentalization abilities, but performing this 
interview with large samples sizes would be untenable save for the well-funded research teams. 
There is a serious need for the development of empathic perspective-taking measures that can be 
used conveniently but which also pull for significant variability in a non-autistic adult 
population. Such a measure would operationalize empathic perspective taking as a 
multidimensional construct by assessing for the ability to discriminate other’s feelings, thoughts, 
and intentions with accuracy.  
Personality Organization and Empathic Perspective-taking 
The present study differs from prior studies in its use of a self-report measure of 
personality organization rather than by comparing a clinical group of personality disordered 
individuals to a control group.  It is important to reiterate that the effect of personality 
organization became non-significant once age was factored in as covariate. Older individuals 
reported less personality dysfunction than younger ones, thus participant’s age and level of 
personality organization were highly related and shared variance in RMET scores. Furthermore, 




practical perspective, then, asking someone’s age would provide more predictive power for 
RMET performance than by administering the IPO-R (and it would be far more convenient, too).    
Individuals with lower levels of personality organization (who were also younger) 
performed significantly worse on the RMET than older, more highly organized participants. This 
finding is consistent with the theoretical literature that suggests empathic difficulties underlie 
personality psychopathology. The empirical literature remains unclear, however, about whether 
individuals with personality disorders perform better or worse than healthy controls on Theory of 
Mind tasks. In a study comparing performance on the Pictures of Facial Affect Measure 
(developed by Ekman & Friesen, 1984), Bland et al. (2004) found that individuals with BPD 
performed significantly worse on identifying facial expressions than healthy controls. Samur et 
al. (2017) found that individuals who struggle with emotional identification and expression 
(alexithymia) perform worse on the RMET. Preißler et al. (2010) compared the performance of a 
group of women with BPD to healthy controls on the RMET and the “Movie for Assessment of 
Social Cognition” (MASC; Dziobek et al, 2006). They found no differences between the groups 
on RMET performance, but found the BPD group exhibited significant deficits in correctly 
identifying the thoughts, feelings, and intentions of characters in the MASC.  
Fertuck et al. (2009), on the other hand, found that individuals with BPD performed 
better than healthy controls on the RMET, particularly on the “neutral” faces and on the overall 
RMET score. They argue individuals with BPD have an enhanced sensitivity to other’s facial 




interpersonal difficulties. Frick et al. (2012) found BPD patients better recognized both positive 
and negative faces on the RMET. Muddying the waters further, Arnoud et al. (2010) found 
individuals with BPD performed similarly to healthy controls on a different Theory of Mind task, 
developed by Happé (1994).  
These contradictory findings do not supply us with an easy answer. Researchers will 
continue to address whether individuals with personality disorders are impaired in their Theory 
of Mind capacities, and if so, in what way. It is worth mentioning that the divergent findings may 
be artifacts of operationalizing empathic perspective-taking in substantially different ways 
(mentalization, social cognition, Theory of Mind) and assuming different Theory of Mind 
measures are capturing the same theoretical construct. The research literature would benefit from 
replicating these studies and making sense of their seemingly disparate findings. New studies 
utilizing different measures and populations might further complicate the situation.   
The IPO-R is a recent revision and remains relatively untested outside of the clinical 
domain (Smits et al., 2009). It is possible that the application of the IPO-R to a non-clinical 
population of undergraduates and Amazon Mechanical Turk workers did not result in a wide 
enough distribution of scores to represent both neurotic and borderline levels of characterological 
organization. Since the authors of the IPO-R do not provide distinct cut-offs for the different 
levels of organization, one must compare “low” to “high” scorers on its scales. The descriptive 
statistics of the present study’s population [M= 63 SD= 18.1], were similar to the non-clinical 




question of whether there were enough individuals exhibiting a borderline character structure 
[clinical patients, M=76, SD=18] (Smits et al., 2009, p. 226) in the present study for adequate 
comparison. In future research, administering the IPO-R to both a personality disordered 
population and non-clinical population, then measuring performance on the RMET, would allow 
for a categorical comparison of RMET scores across these levels of personality organization.  
Limitations 
A limitation that plagues online experiments is that one cannot guarantee participants 
demonstrated attention and effort during the intervention (reading the passage) and during self-
report questionnaires. Efforts were made to reinforce concentration by requiring participants to 
read for at least 200 seconds before they could continue to the next task. Furthermore, 
participants were forewarned that a control question about the passage would be asked at the end 
of the experiment. All participants answered the control question correctly, exhibiting at least 
minimal attention while reading the passage. 
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Appendix I: Sample Items from the Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test  
(Baron-Cohen & Wheelwright, 2001) 
 
 







jealous                panicked 
 
 















terrified                  upset 
 
 







Appendix II: Sample Stories from the Faux Pas Detection Test  
 (Baron Cohen et al., 1995) 
 
Sample Control Story 
Story 1. Vicky was at a party at her friend Oliver’s house. She was talking to Oliver when 
another woman came up to them. She was one of Oliver’s neighbors. The woman said, "Hello," 
then turned to Vicky and said, " I don't think we've met. I’m Maria, what's your name?"   
"I’m Vicky."  
"Would anyone like something to drink?" Oliver asked.  
   
1. Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?  
  
  
If yes, ask:  
  
2. Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?  
  
   
3. Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?  
  
    
4. Why do you think he/she said it?  
   
  
  
5. Did Vicky and Maria know each other?  
  
  
6. How do you think Vicky felt?  
  
  
 Control questions:  7.  In the story, where was Vicky?  
 




Sample Faux Pas Story 
Story 2. Helen's husband was throwing a surprise party for her birthday. He invited Sarah, a 
friend of Helen's, and said, "Don't tell anyone, especially Helen." The day before the party, Helen 
was over at Sarah's and Sarah spilled some coffee on a new dress that was hanging over her 
chair. "Oh!" said Sarah, "I was going to wear this to your party!"  "What party?" said Helen.  
 "Come on," said Sarah, "Let's go see if we can get the stain out."  
 Did anyone say something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?  
  
If yes, ask:  
 Who said something they shouldn't have said or something awkward?  
   
1. Why shouldn't he/she have said it or why was it awkward?  
  
  
   





3. Did Sarah remember that the party was a surprise party?  
  
  
4. How do you think Helen felt?  
  
   
  
Control question:   7.  In the story, who was the surprise party for?  
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